April 2026

I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for tabling amendment 1. We owe a debt of gratitude to those who serve, and of course we have an ongoing duty of care to those who have given service to their country but can no longer serve due to medical issues, especially if those issues were a result of their service. Statistics show that there were about 1,900 people medically discharged in financial year 2024-25—700 of those were for musculoskeletal issues, and 800 were for m

We do not have an estimate of how many people will opt in, and I think that would be very difficult to gauge. First, a lot of those individuals already have a liability, because they may be on 18 years already—some will be on six or four years, and some will be officers. To gauge how many people are already in and how many people are going to opt in is very difficult. I would like to think that a lot will opt in, but if they do not, we already have the existing Strategic Reserve, which is at cir

Clause 32 amends the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to enable the Secretary of State to disapply aggregate service for members of the reserve forces when making a call-out order under sections 52 or 54 of the 1996 Act. Currently, the maximum duration of service under a call-out order under section 52—for national danger, great emergency or an attack on the United Kingdom— cannot usually exceed three years, and is usually 12 months for “warlike operations”. This maximum duration is calculated by combini

I mentioned some statistics about what we have now. It is circa 90,000 to 95,000 when we add in the four-year, six-year and 18-year mix that we have across our terms of service. If we then add on, say, five years times 15,000, we again get into the space of about 150,000 to just shy of 200,000. When we look at the maths for the Army, we see that it needs about an echelon to two echelons in depth, and then it needs a training cadre to deliver that capability. That training cadre will primarily be

I would like to return to the hon. Gentleman with the detail around that vetting process, but I will give an example of some of the complexities. If an individual leaves and goes to work overseas for another company, that may invalidate their DV status, so we need to take it case by case. However, he is absolutely right that we need to make it easier, if we are going to adopt a zig-zag career process, for vetting to follow suit, almost by exception, but individual cases need to be taken into con

Because of the decentralised nature of the military, some units, depending on reserve liability, will absolutely try to recruit those individuals into the reserve immediately. There is not carte blanche across the entire military, because in some areas we do not necessarily need those individuals in the reserves—if that makes sense. Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble, there is a lot more work to do to make the transition much smoother. Clause 31 will reduc

My hon. Friend highlights a good point. That issue is replicated across the entire service—not in all cases, but in many. People are having to go back through medical within six months of leaving, having to go back through basic training, or having to redo the commando course—you name it. There is a litany of issues. The Minister for Veterans and People is looking at that to see how we speed up the process. Sometimes there is no room for those individuals in the reserve liability, given the rank

I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for the amendment. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford, and I thank the Clerks and staff, who are doing a fantastic job. I acknowledge Members’ concerns about the importance of retaining skills in the armed forces, which we all agree is critical to ensuring that we have a fighting force. Let me address amendment 7. Despite the well-documented historical shortfalls in recruitment and retention, the figures a

On a point of order, Mr Efford. I take this opportunity to thank all colleagues and all Opposition Members for our healthy and important debates. Importantly, I also thank all the Clerks, officials and you in the Chair, Mr Efford, for pulling the Committee together and making it run smoothly. It is not lost on me that the Bill is hugely important. A lot of the clauses are about getting us ready and preparing us should a crisis befall the country. The Bill is doing nothing other than thickening o

Very kind. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill and acknowledge his request for us to publish a defence readiness plan that must include information about the numbers and readiness of the reserve forces. One of the main reasons we are underinsured, underprepared and under attack is the systemic underfunding of defence over the last 20 years, and since the end of the cold war, and our pursuit of usually non-state actors at a cost to our state-countering capability. However, for the first

The DIP will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member and, on those grounds, I ask him not to press the new clause.

Our aim is to ensure that the decisions in the plan are robust and support the development of current and future capabilities to help drive the transformation of the armed forces, as described in the strategic defence review. It will be an affordable, deliverable programme to transform our armed forces, and it will highlight how this Government’s historic investment in defence will deliver warfighting readiness to deter increased threats and drive defence as an engine for growth. We have announc

First, to be absolutely clear, we are not blaming officials in any way, shape or form. What we are saying is that when the leadership is changed every 10 to 15 minutes, consistency in command and control will be lost. An individual who has such experience in command will know that, and the hon. Member knows—the Committee knows—that when people are shuffled and changed every six months to a year, the system resets. That is not a problem with officials; it is, unfortunately, the culture that we ha

No, no, no.

My hon. Friend highlights that this is not just a multifaceted problem within defence or the security architecture of the nation, but a consequence of what the broader Government inherited collectively. If not over 14 years, at least in the last four years, we saw Ministers change at such a fast rate, we ceded responsibility to the civil service, and we sat in a wallow of bureaucracy and process that has delivered nothing. That is why we are having to deliver the change required to get after it.

It has everything to do with it. The Committee needs to understand the details of what has been left, because it has everything to do with it. We cannot take anything in isolation; it is all combined. As a result, we have a deeply complex problem set to deal with.

The reality is that we are already spending. We have awarded more than 1,200 major contracts since the election. There is a £1 billion contract for military helicopters in Yeovil, £500 million has been invested in state-of-the-art British Typhoon jets, and there has been a £100 million boost for the RAF P-8 submarine-hunting aircraft. The DIP needs to come, but we have collectively been left an exceptionally complex problem set. The war in Ukraine is driving transformation, and we have a hollowe

The right hon. Gentleman left a massively hollowed-out and underfunded defence.

I would like to correct Hansard, because I think there was a slip of the tongue when the right hon. Gentleman said “drip”, not “DIP”. There seems to be an element of dripping going on about the DIP. Well, for 14 years there has been a dip in morale, a dip in recruitment and retention, a dip in ship orders, a dip in aircraft orders, a dip in capability, a dip in successful major programmes—48 or 49 major projects have been delayed or over budget—and a dip across a whole plethora of capability in